The Captain’s Silence: A Seattle Court Rules on Brutality at Sea

Decision of Judge Jacobs.

In the U.S. District Court, Third Judicial District, W.T., holding Terms at Seattle.

Frank Griffin, vs. E. A. Nickels, in Admiralty.

Justice Story, that great Jurist, in speaking of a case similar in nearly all of its facts and averments to this says: "The principle of law upon this subject appear to me to be equally clear and salutary in point of policy. The master has the supreme authority on board of his ship; and has, moreover, a sort of parental responsibility and duty devolved upon him, for the due exercise of it. It is his duty to prevent, as far as he may, any undue exercise of authority by his subordinate officers, and any abuses, injuries and trespasses by them. If he is present when any of the subordinate officers inflict chastisement upon the seaman, he is bound in duty to interfere and restrain it, if it is improper in its nature and character, or unjustifiable under the circumstances.

If he may interfere and he does not, he must be deemed to assent to and encourage it; for no officer in his presence has a right to inflict punishment without his assent or direction, unless upon an emergency which admits of no delay. It is not sufficient to excuse himself from this interposition upon any notion of courtesy, or of upholding the authority of the officers, or supporting harmony and discipline of the ship. The law has entrusted him with summary powers, for the good not of the officers alone, but of the crew also and indeed for the general good of the maritime service, in which he is engaged.

While he should uphold the just discipline of the ship with a steady confidence, he is to take care that the seamen are not made the victims of the insolence, the passions or the caprices of the officers under him. If he will stand by and see the seamen cruelly, brutally and unjustifiably beaten without interference he ought not to complain that the law forces upon him the conclusion that he approves what is done and means to encourage it by his silence and his authority. He becomes thereby the abettor and supporter of the deed, upon the reasonable ground that he who knowing allows oppression shares the crime."

The question is, what are the principles by which we may determine whether an act is done by his authority or not. The principle laid down above is, that if he is present and might have prevented it and did not, then it is done by his authority. Again; if he stands by and sees the seamen cruelly, brutally and unjustifiably beaten without interference, his non-action and silence is acquiescence and authority.

Such is the law governing this case; now what are the facts from the evidence:

1. We are impressed with the fact that every man whose duty it was to be on deck and who by the acknowledgement of all who were on deck and near to the spot of the fray swear positively that Capt. Nickels was on the spot from a time prior to the first mate's coming down with an iron bar till the bleeding and mangled victim was lifted from the deck and was taken forward to have his wounds dressed. They were but two or three yards away during the whole time.

2. Although not the cold, dumb, story in all its minute particulars and with the most formal speech no one would believe. The circumstances of the passions from the alibi not our courtesy and undue threats were nearer still. The carpenter and especially the cook was quite a distance away, one about 70 feet the other over a hundred. Now the other thing being equal those who were immediately present had the best means of knowing whereof they asserted and ought to be believed in preference to the others.

3. There were four of these persons and three of the opposition witnesses including the Captain. The testimony of these four acknowledged to be fair, but that of the fourth, is said to be impeached... I cannot disbelieve Meagher without disbelieving nearly all the witnesses who have testified in the case.

I am compelled to find from the testimony therefore, that the Captain, notwithstanding his statement to the contrary, was present during this affray and that he might have prevented it, but did not, that he by his silence and non-action acquiesced in the assault there made and is in law responsible for the consequences.