The Mayor's Power to Fire: Seattle's Removed Police Commissioners Fight for Their Jobs

The cases of J. G. Niggle and E. G. Cheasty, the removed police commissioners, against Mayor Byron Phelps, to test the legality of their removal, came up before Judge Langley yesterday. The proceedings were instituted by Niggle and Cheasty to set aside, if possible, their removal from the office of police commissioner, from which they were removed for cause by the mayor. The case came before the court on writ of certiorari and, after argument, was taken under advisement by the court.

James B. Howe, in stating the case, said that Niggle was a duly qualified police commissioner and was summarily removed from office without due process of law; in other words, without a trial or a hearing. If the mayor had acted judicially he was subject to correction by a writ of certiorari. He would take up both cases jointly, as they were similar. Mr. Howe read the findings and judgment of the mayor and said the men had been removed without a chance for explanation or defense. The whole question in a nutshell was whether the mayor was invested with discretionary power to remove at pleasure or whether he could only remove his appointees for cause.

Mr. Howe held that the mayor could remove for cause, but that cause meant notice, trial and judicial determination. He quoted section 1, article 7 of the city charter and argued that the police commissioners had a fixed term of office and held their places independent of the mayor. Among other things the charter says that a police commissioner can be removed and convicted if he influenced in a wrong way any member of the police department. In the case of the chief of police the charter made it discretionary with the police commissioners to remove him at pleasure, but in the case of the police commissioner they could only be removed for cause, and he interpreted 'cause' to mean notice, trial and legal determination of the charges against them. Mr. Howe cited State v. Van Brocklin, McBeavy v. Burke and People v. Whitney, and Dillon on municipal corporations. He concluded that the mayor had not complied with the law and that the court should restore the commissioners to their offices.

Corporation Counsel Scott spoke on behalf of Mayor Phelps and the city. Mr. Scott said that where specific charges are required and a notice of hearing must be had to render a removal lawful, the removing officer or body proceeds judicially, and the decision may be reviewed by the court; but when the law provides no mode of exercising the power, the mayor may determine that such cause exists upon such evidence and in such mode as he may deem proper, and does not act judicially. If the charter had intended to erect the mayor into a kind of judicial tribunal which could not get jurisdiction of the person without notice, it would have provided some mode for its regulation, such as serving notice, compelling the attendance of witnesses and administering oaths. To constitute the mayor a judicial tribunal could not therefore have been the intent of the framers of the charter.

Speaking of this power, Mr. Scott continued: 'It is absolute where it is vested in the unlimited discretion of the removing officer, to be exercised at such time and for such reasons as the latter may deem proper and sufficient. It is conditioned when the time, the manner or the reason is placed beyond the mere discretion of the removing officer.' He argued that under the charter the removal was legal and should be sustained.