A Judge Strikes Down the Ordinance That Told Teamsters to 'Move On'

The ordinance passed by the administration and signed by Mayor J. T. Ronald, intended to prevent teamsters from making their daily stands at certain streets, was knocked out in Judge Glasgow's court yesterday on a demurrer to the complaint by Attorney J. T. Ronald, which takes exception to a section on which the charge is based. The case was a test one, and the courtroom was filled by teamsters of all trades whose interests awaited the judge's decision. The case was that of the City vs. G. Burns, who was charged by I. Kofn with obstructing the street on Labor place by means of his vehicle, in violation of section 7 of the ordinance which was passed in February, 1893, and signed by J. T. Ronald, then mayor of the city. The section reads as follows:

"No person shall keep or cause to be kept any cart, coach, wagon, dray or other vehicle on any street or avenue after having been notified by the board of public works that such vehicle is an obstruction."

Mr. Ronald made a lengthy argument attacking the validity of section 7, contending that the provisions of that section as it stood actually conferred on the board of public works judicial power vested only in a court, which alone could define what an obstruction was. That section gave the board of public works arbitrary power, in that no matter whether the defendant was obstructing the street or not, if he was merely notified by the board that he was so obstructing and failed to move away, he was, according to the reading of that section, subject to a fine of $100 or imprisonment for one month. This was neither justice nor law; it was unconstitutional and clothed the board with judicial power, making it discretionary with the board to say to one man "move on" when there was no apparent necessity for it, favoring one teamster to the injury of another, and in short attempting to make a crime out of something which in its very nature is not criminal. Mr. Ronald explained away his dual position of fighting an ordinance bearing his own name as mayor by saying that when the ordinance was first presented to him he prepared a veto for it because of section 7 and others like it, but the rest of the ordinance contained so many good provisions covering needed reforms that he decided to pass over the weak sections in order to get the immediate benefits of the others; hence he burned the veto and signed the ordinance as a whole.

Corporation Counsel Scott contended that the portion of the section requiring notification from the board of public works was only preliminary to the commencement of a prosecution. Judge Glasgow promptly sustained the demurrer, saying he had no doubt in his mind that the section was faulty and therefore invalid. Corporation Counsel Scott said subsequently that he would at once prepare a new ordinance remedying the defects in the one knocked out and word it in a manner to make the next case stick.