The Clerk vs. The Judge: A Battle Over Legal Authority
When a clerk in the Third Judicial District overstepped his bounds, a Chief Justice used the case of James Steel to affirm that only a judge possesses the power to declare the law.
In the case of James Steel vs. D. L. Yesler in the District Court of the Third Judicial District at Seattle, a motion was brought to set aside a default and judgment. Personal service was made on the defendant on March 16, 1877. On April 10, 1877, on motion of counsel for the plaintiff, the clerk in vacation entered the default of the defendant and rendered judgment thereon. The defendant moved to vacate this, arguing the clerk had no authority to act without an order from the Court or Judge. Chief Justice J. R. Lewis addressed this issue, noting that while the practice had long existed, he had always held doubts about the clerk's power to exercise judicial authority. He cited a ruling from Brother Greene of the Second District, stating, 'It is fallacious to say that the judgment on default is the judgment of the law, and that therefore the clerk has the right ministerially to enter it without the direction of the Judge.' Judge Lewis concluded that the clerk's powers are strictly ministerial, and any legislative attempt to vest judicial power—such as declaring a default—in a clerk is void. The entry of judgment in this case was vacated.
“Strictly speaking, no lawful judgment is the judgment of the Judge; it is the judgment of the law, and is simply announced by the Judge.”
This 1877 legal dispute highlights the enduring American tension between administrative convenience and the necessity of judicial oversight. Today, as automated systems and digital court filings threaten to turn legal processes into mere clerical 'box-checking,' the Chief Justice's insistence on human judicial discretion remains a vital democratic check.
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