The Editor, the Chief, and the 'Police Abomination' Libel Trial

The second day's proceedings in the Lugrin libel yesterday were not devoid of features. The audience filled the little, stuffy court room to suffocation. There were people seated even in the prisoners' dock, and 'standing room' was not to be had during a greater portion of the day. A portion of the audience, among which were a few leading gamblers and John W. Considine, showed a disposition to crowd up to the jurymen. Bailiff Brooks in vain tried to keep them at a respectful distance, and Judge Glasgow finally spoke up and ordered the crowd to keep away from the jury. This proved effective. The defendant, Charles H. Lugrin, accepted the situation with considerable philosophy. His countenance is not like an open book, as are those of Gleason and Crews. He seemed bored by the proceedings, and his countenance was stolid most of the time. He would, however, summon up a faint smile when anything funny happened. The testimony given by those gentlemen connected with the Telegraph who were called by the state to the effect that they did not know that Charles H. Lugrin was the managing editor of the Telegraph, was a surprise to a large number of those who were in the court room. In fact it caused an audible smile, which became louder as the denials proceeded. The case made considerable progress yesterday. All the evidence for the state was submitted and then Attorney Will H. Thompson moved for a dismissal on the ground that the name of the paper had not been correctly stated in the information and for the reason that the burden of proof that the article was false rested on the state, and because it had not been proven that C. H. Lugrin had written the article that appeared in the Seattle Telegraph on June 22. After argument by counsel Judge Glasgow refused to dismiss the case and said it would be submitted to the jury on the evidence. J. A. Costello, assistant city editor of the Telegraph, was the first witness called by the state, and he was asked if C. H. Lugrin was the editor of the Telegraph on June 22, at the time of the publication of the alleged libel. Mr. Costello could not remember whether Mr. Lugrin was with the paper on that day, but he thought he was connected with the Telegraph on or about that time. Mr. Allen, on behalf of the state, read the article on which the arrest was based, and offered it in evidence. Mr. Thompson, for the defense, objected. He held that no proof had been adduced to show that the defendant had written any of the articles, and he therefore held that the declarations of the paper could not be held against him. Mr. Allen held that Mr. Lugrin was editor and business manager at the time of the publication of the article entitled 'A Police Abomination,' and this fact alone was sufficient under the law to make him legally responsible for its publication. Judge Glasgow overruled the objection and the paper was duly admitted in evidence. At the head of the editorial column this paper contains the announcement that communications should be addressed to C. H. Lugrin, managing editor. Robert Bolton Rogers was called. He testified that he was chief of the Seattle police department from April 1, 1891, till March 26, 1892, and was reappointed May 24, 1894, and has been chief ever since. He was chief of police on June 22, 1894. Certified copies of Rogers' appointments as chief of police were offered in evidence. Mr. Allen then said that the state rested its case. Mr. Thompson then arose and made a motion that the court dismiss the jury and discharge the defendant. Judge Glasgow asked if it would not take some little time to argue the case. Mr. Thompson replied that it would take two or three hours. The jury was then dismissed until 9 o'clock tomorrow morning. Judge Glasgow cautioned the jury to be careful not to talk to anyone about the case, and to report to him if any came to them and tried to talk about it to them. Mr. Thompson then arose and made a logical and graceful speech in support of his motion that the case be dismissed. He held that the information was defective, inasmuch as it charged the Seattle Daily Telegraph with publishing a libel. There was no such a paper published as the Seattle Daily Telegraph. There was, however, a paper called the Seattle Telegraph. Mr. Thompson's principal contention, however, was that the state had only made a prima facie case; that in a criminal libel the burden of proof as to the falsity of a libel rested on the state, and that the state had utterly failed to establish a case in this respect; that it was necessary to establish beyond a reasonable doubt every allegation of the complaint. The state had merely proved that Lugrin was connected in some way with the Seattle Telegraph, but not a scintilla of evidence had been offered to prove that he was the author of the article on which the prosecution was based. It was absolutely necessary to prove that Lugrin was its author. He held that, if Lugrin went on the witness stand and testified that he wrote the article, printed it and circulated it himself, he could not be convicted unless there was corroborative testimony. He held that it was not the duty of the defense to prove that the article was true. In support of his position Mr. Thompson read numerous authorities and quoted the libel law of Illinois and other states. He held that the court could not ask the jury to find Mr. Lugrin guilty upon presumption. Mr. Allen made a strong speech in reply to Mr. Thompson. He held that the state did not have to prove that Mr. Lugrin wrote the article, but only that he published or caused it to be published. He contended that when the state proved the publication in the Seattle Telegraph and that Lugrin was the managing editor it was to charge him with the responsibility for its publication. Since the article charged Rogers with committing a felony, the presumption of innocence was sufficient proof of the falsity of the charge, and the burden of proving the charge rested with the defendant. In support of this point Mr. Allen quoted from authorities. Judge Glasgow overruled the motion to discharge the defendant. He held that the information was sufficient; that the variance in the name of the paper was not material with regard to the defendant's rights. In regard to the evidence, he held that the state's evidence was not sufficient to establish the publication, but there was considerable evidence to that effect. He held that under the circumstances newspapers are responsible for articles even if it is next to impossible to prove who wrote them. He said the state had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the publication was false. He held, however, that the state did not have to prove the article was false when he quoted the state law that under certain circumstances an article, even if true, might be libelous. In conclusion, he did not see that the state should be required to prove the statement was false. Therefore he overruled the motion for a dismissal, and decided that the case should go to the jury upon the evidence submitted.