The Court Let Harbor Lines Reach Beyond the City Limits

The other new question presented is as to the jurisdiction of said board to establish harbor lines in navigable waters in front of a town as distinguished from a city. It is conceded that Ballard, in front of which the proposed line was about to be established, is an incorporated town, but that it is not a city within the restricted and technical meaning of such word. Upon these facts it is contended by respondent that said board have no right to establish harbor lines in front thereof. Its contention in this regard being that the constitution has only provided for the jurisdiction of said board in front of cities. This contention is denied by appellants, and we are therefore called upon to examine the question.

If the only expression in the constitution was that in the first section of Article XV, there would be much force in the argument presented by the respondent, but when such section is construed in the light of section 3 of said article and of other provisions of the constitution, it seems to us that this narrow and technical construction of the word 'city' cannot be sustained. Said section 3 is certainly broad enough to cover towns as well as cities, and we think that the language thereof having been used in immediate connection with that in which the word 'city' occurs, shows clearly the intention of the constitution makers to broaden the definition of said word so that it might include towns. And we cannot agree with the contention of the respondent that it will follow that such word would also include a county or school district. For while it is true that in a certain sense these may be municipal corporations, yet they are not such in the same sense that cities and towns are. Besides said section three clearly shows that the municipal corporations there referred to are only those which have power to lay out streets. In the legislation had upon the subject under such constitutional provisions it is manifest that the legislature intended that the jurisdiction of said board should extend to the waters in front of towns as well as cities. This is evident from the whole scope of the legislation, and it is not necessary to point out the particular clauses which tend to show such intention.

To hold that the constitution makers and the legislature intended to draw the line strictly as between cities and towns as technically understood would be to convict them of an absurdity. Under the system for the creation of municipal corporations existing in most of the states of the Union, there was no well-defined line of demarcation between the two—cities, as such, and towns. Under such system the nature of the charter of a municipal corporation did not depend upon the number of inhabitants thereof, but upon the will of the legislature, which usually reflected the choice of the people of such corporation; and it was not an infrequent occurrence to find a body of people governed by a charter conferring all the powers of a city in the strictest sense, while in the immediate vicinity might be found another body of people of double the number, whose charter of incorporation conferred only such powers as were usually incident to towns. So that if the strict and technical interpretation of these words as used before the constitution was adopted should obtain, and it be held that the harbor line commissioners had authority in relation to cities, but did not have as to towns, it might happen that their jurisdiction would extend in one case over a certain body of people as a municipal corporation, while in another and similar case a body of people much larger would be deprived of the protection of such board.

It seems so clear to us that the word 'city' cannot be construed as contended for by the respondent that we shall say nothing further on the subject. We would cite, however, two cases which, although not exactly in point in all respects, seem to us to be decisive of the principle involved in this case: People vs. Stephens, 62 Cal. 236; Van Riper v. Parsons, 40 N. J. L. 4.

It will be seen from the above discussion that the new points presented by this record are not sufficient to take this case out of the rule announced in the case of Harbor Line Commissioners vs. State, above cited.

The judgment of the court below must be reversed, and the cause remanded with instructions to dismiss the proceeding.

We concur: Dunbar, J.; Scott, J.; Stiles, J.