The Lake Washington Land Fight That Turned on a Cabin, a Railroad Claim, and 'Crazy' Miller
A decade-long homestead contest ends with William L. Miller keeping first claim—if he or his guardian can prove it within 90 days. His rival says the cabin was never really a home.
The local land office yesterday received a decision from the general land commissioner in the case of Daniel T. Carr vs. William L. Miller, involving the northeast quarter of the northeast quarter, west half of the northeast quarter, and southeast quarter of the northwest quarter of section 5, township 24 north, range 5 east, located on Lake Washington, in which the action of the local land office is affirmed in favor of Miller, who is known among his former neighbors as 'Crazy' Miller, being the son of the suspected murderer of J. Manning Colman.
The land in controversy was at one time withdrawn for the benefit of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, but all claim of that company is now eliminated.
On November 20, Frances H. Ledger applied to file a pre-emption declaratory statement for the northeast quarter and northeast quarter of northwest quarter of section 5, alleging settlement November 5, 1884. On January 20, William L. Miller made homestead entry for the southeast quarter of northwest quarter, southwest quarter of northeast quarter and north half of northeast quarter of the same section, alleging settlement in November, 1884. On the same day George A. Taylor filed a declaratory statement for the north half of northeast quarter and southwest quarter of northeast quarter of the same section, alleging settlement January 26, 1885. On January 27, 1887, Daniel T. Carr applied to file a pre-emption declaratory statement for the northeast quarter of the northeast quarter, west half of northeast quarter and southeast quarter of northwest quarter of the same section. This application was rejected because the land was embraced in Miller's homestead entry. Carr appealed, alleging that Miller's homestead entry was illegal for the reason that Miller was not qualified to make it. On February 24, 1888, Carr made affidavit that Miller was then under 21 years of age and not the head of a family, and asked a hearing to determine Miller's qualifications. This application was corroborated by that of Albert Burrows filed March 9, 1888.
On January 27, 1892, Carr filed an affidavit in which he said that he settled on the land January 1, 1885; that on January 26, 1885, he completed the foundation of a house and did other work on it; that the appeal taken by him from the rejection of his application was still pending and undetermined; that he had resided on, improved and cultivated the tract and in every way complied with the pre-emption law so as to entitle him to make proof therefor; that Miller had not complied with the homestead law as to residence and cultivation; that his residence had only been at intervals, and that during the last year he had neither raised a crop nor resided on the land; and he asked that Miller's entry be canceled and his application allowed. All parties were given a hearing February 15, 1893, at which Carr and Miller were present, but Ledger made default.
The commissioner says: 'If Taylor settled on the land covered by his filing January 26, 1885, it is clear he did not follow such settlement up by occupancy, and that he has neither inhabited, improved nor erected a dwelling house thereon. Since January 26, 1885, now over ten years, he has totally failed to prosecute any claim he may once have had to the land. His pre-emption filing is, therefore, hereby canceled, and this cancellation, the elimination of the railroad claim and the default of Ledger reduce the parties to the proceedings to Miller and Carr.'
The local office held that there were only two questions to be determined, the age of Miller at the time he made his entry and the priority of the settlement of the respective parties on the land involved, and decided that the preponderance of evidence establishes the fact of Miller's prior settlement and of his being of age at the time he tendered his application. From this decision Carr appealed.
The commissioner concurs in this finding of Miller's priority and age, but does not concur that those are the only questions presented in the case, as the issue raised by Carr in his affidavit alleging residence and improvements seems to have been overlooked by the local office.
The evidence shows that Miller commenced the erection of a cabin in November, and finished it in January, 1885; that he had a stove, a bed and a blanket or two in the cabin, and that he slept and ate there a part of the time from January to March 8, 1885; that a few rods of land had been cleared, fenced and cultivated, and about an acre and a half slashed and partly cleared. The evidence fails to show the value of these improvements, or that the cabin was inhabited at all seasons of the year; nor is it satisfactorily shown that Miller ever made the land his home to the exclusion of a home elsewhere.
'The evidence on behalf of Carr,' the commissioner continues, 'shows that on January 26, 1885, he cleared a small piece of ground and commenced the foundation of a house on this land, which he finished January 31; that in the spring of 1885 he got logs for a house, and cleared land for a garden; that he afterwards became sick, and that he had to work out part of the time to obtain money to support himself and family; that in October, 1885, he finished a dwelling house of logs, cut eighteen by twenty-three feet, and that since that time he has resided continuously on the land; that he has raised hay, oats, potatoes, garden vegetables and strawberries, and kept a cow, a horse part of the time and poultry. His house is inhabited at all times of the year; he has cleared and cultivated about five and a half acres and cut and rolled logs on about three and three-quarters acres additional. To clear and put this land in proper condition for cultivation is worth $100 per acre. In addition to these improvements he has on the land a barn, 16x20, with a shed ten feet wide attached, a chicken house and yard and from twenty-five to thirty fruit trees, all the improvements being estimated to be worth [sum].'
'It further appears that Miller was committed to the insane asylum on March 13, that he was subsequently discharged from the asylum, but when discharged and whether discharged as cured does not appear, that he was again committed to the asylum, but when does not appear, that he was an inmate of the asylum at the date of the hearing, February 23, 1893, and that a guardian of property has been appointed.
'In view of the facts in the case and in order to close this long-standing controversy, Miller in person, if restored to mental health, and if not, by his legally authorized guardian, will be permitted to make homestead proof within ninety days from notice hereof, failing in which his homestead entry, now held for cancellation, will be canceled without further notice.'
The commissioner adds that if application is made on behalf of Miller, Carr is to be given notice of time and place proof is to be made, and he is to be allowed full opportunity to be heard in opposition to the acceptance of the proofs; except that he will not be permitted to be heard again on the two questions already adjudicated, namely, Miller's age and priority of settlement.
“The evidence fails to show the value of these improvements, or that the cabin was inhabited at all seasons of the year; nor is it satisfactorily shown that Miller ever made the land his home to the exclusion of a home elsewhere.”
The case is a reminder that Seattle's shoreline was once contested acre by acre, with railroad withdrawals, pre-emption filings and homestead proofs deciding who belonged. It also shows how mental illness and guardianship could become part of a property fight—a scenario that still surfaces in modern land and estate disputes.
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