Twenty-Three Miners Died. An Old Miner Blamed the Air.
After an explosion at Blue Canyon in Whatcom County killed 23 men, a veteran miner wrote to the Seattle Post-Intelligencer that the mines were not properly ventilated—and that inspectors and bosses ignored miners who knew better.
COAL MINE EXPLOSIONS. An Old Miner Says the Mines Are Not Properly Ventilated.
Seattle, April 9, 1895. To the Editor: I see an account in your paper today of another disaster in our mines, this time at Blue Canyon, Whatcom County, where twenty-three miners lost their lives. I hope it is the last of its kind, but fear it is not, knowing full well how our mines are ventilated. The mine inspector's report and that of the commissioner are generally that the mine was well ventilated, but not so the miner, if one should ask him—unless you ask him in the presence of the boss or the inspector.
The writer has twenty-five years' experience at mining, seven years in the old country and seventeen years in the United States, in different parts, and has found only two well-ventilated mines, one in Illinois and one on this Coast. In other words, he found only two competent men who understood ventilation. Many miners who have practical knowledge employed in the mines know more about successful management of a mine than their superiors in office, but they are well aware that they dare not suggest any improvement unless they are ready to quit work. They know that they would be victimized.
The people, or outsiders, will say: We have a mine inspector; why should so many disasters occur? Is it negligence? What are they paid for? Yes, we have inspectors, and the writer has known two who had no knowledge of ventilation or the dangers in the mine, as their practical knowledge of mining was limited, but they had book knowledge, by collecting books from older mining states on gases, etc., and after a study of these books for a time they would pass examination. If a man with practical knowledge will make use of books, he knows that his knowledge is superior and that by practice he can obtain the desired end. Such a man in a responsible position—there is not a miner but will have full confidence in him and trust him with his life.
The writer quit mining because he saw the dangers in our mines, and he wrote articles on ventilation in the Seattle Intelligencer then and told the manager of one of our leading mines what would be the consequence unless a change was made, but the manager saw no danger then. Look at our mines today and see if they are free from danger. Can that be prevented? I say yes. Some of our companies prefer sending to Pennsylvania for a superintendent. One company entered into an agreement to pay such a man a stated salary for a certain period, and before his time expired the company found he was a grand duffer. It dismissed him and paid him six months' salary. At the same time the company had men in its employ who could have run the mine to the best advantage and saved the company thousands of dollars.
I admit that accidents will happen in the mines, since every man does not understand all the details, but slaughter can be prevented.
“The mine inspector's report and that of the commissioner are generally that the mine was well ventilated, but not so the miner, if one should ask him—unless you ask him in the presence of the boss or the inspector.”
Coal mine disasters in Washington were often followed by assurances that inspectors had approved ventilation, just as today's workplace deaths prompt questions about regulatory capture and whistleblower retaliation. The letter is a reminder that the people closest to danger usually see it first—and are often least empowered to stop it.
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