The Constitutional Question of Local Option
A landmark court ruling in Dayton challenged the constitutionality of Washington's local option liquor laws, sparking a debate on police power and contracts.
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A decision of importance was made by Judge Langford, at Dayton, September 2d, on a habeas corpus case of Jacob Schuman, who had been arrested for violating the local option act by selling intoxicating liquors at Dayton and was bound over to appear before the Grand Jury at the next term of the District Court at Dayton. A writ of habeas corpus was sued out upon the ground, as alleged, that the local option act was unconstitutional and void. Messrs. Sharpstein & Sharpstein appeared for the petitioner, and Messrs. H. F. Sturdevant and D. J. Crowley for the Territory. The syllabus of the decision explores whether the police power of the Legislature extends to matters of public health and morale to the point of impairing property value without compensation, and whether the payment for a liquor license creates a binding contract between the State and the licensee that cannot be arbitrarily rescinded.
“The local option act does not take effect by virtue of its own force. When the Legislature passed it, it was a mere proposition and not a law, and was to be a law only when the people in the different precincts adopted it.”
This 1886 dispute over local liquor ordinances highlights the long-standing tension between state police powers and local municipal control—a dynamic that remains central to Seattle's current debates over public safety, zoning, and homelessness ordinances.
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