The Jury That Usurped the Bench
After a man accused of shooting a superintendent was acquitted, the Post-Intelligencer launches a scathing critique of 'lawless' juries who favor sentiment over evidence.
The story, cleaned up
A cleaned-up reading of the newspaper page: spelling and layout repaired, one story lifted off a crowded page. It follows the original closely but it is not a transcription. The original page is below; read it if a detail matters.
The verdict of acquittal in the case of Patrick Lavan, who was tried for shooting Street Superintendent Cummings in his office, July 11, 1892, was an outrage on law and justice. The shooting was not denied, and yet the jury acquitted Lavan. Under their oath, the jury was obliged to find a verdict in accordance with the evidence. The jury had a right to find Lavan guilty with a recommendation to the mercy of the court, but they had no right to acquit the accused. By a verdict of acquittal, the jury evidently intended to usurp the functions of the court. This case is a good illustration of what might be called utterly lawless juries, who violate their oaths by finding verdicts of acquittal in the face of full testimony of guilt. Such sentimental verdicts are an outrage on truth—moral perjury on the part of the juror—and they are destructive of the efficiency of the whole administration of justice.
“The jury has no legal business to award mercy, or to fix its measure; it belongs to the court.”
This editorial highlights the long-standing tension between the letter of the law and 'jury nullification,' a practice where juries refuse to convict if they feel the law or the sentencing is unjust. In modern Seattle, debates over prosecutorial discretion and judicial reform mirror this 1893 concern over whether the court or the community should determine the definition of justice.
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