The Insanity Defense in the Lavan Case
A reader challenges the P-I’s skepticism regarding a jury's decision to acquit Patrick Lavan on grounds of insanity.
The story, cleaned up
A cleaned-up reading of the newspaper page: spelling and layout repaired, one story lifted off a crowded page. It follows the original closely but it is not a transcription. The original page is below; read it if a detail matters.
To the Editor: Your editorial in this morning's issue of your paper does the jury in the case of the state vs. Patrick Lavan a great injustice. The defendant did not deny the shooting, but alleged as a defense that at the time of the shooting he was insane. No less than eight reputable citizens of this city, who have known Mr. Lavan for several years, testified to his insanity and his conduct as observed by them for a long time prior to and upon the very day of the shooting. Among the witnesses was Dr. P. B. M. Miller, one of the most eminent physicians in this city. Under the law, the defendant is not required to prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence; it is sufficient to secure an acquittal if the jury entertains a reasonable doubt as to his sanity. Having concluded from the evidence that the defendant was insane at the time of the shooting, the jury could not have returned a verdict other than the one they did without violating their oaths. God pity the day when a citizen shall be condemned by popular clamor or public outcry.
“God pity the day when a citizen shall be condemned by popular clamor or public outcry.”
The tension between public outcry for justice and the legal definition of criminal responsibility remains a recurring flashpoint in Seattle's civic discourse. This 1893 debate over the insanity defense mirrors modern struggles where community desire for harsh retribution often clashes with medical and legal nuances in the courtroom.
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